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Abstract
Arguably, liberal democratic societies are seeing the emergence of a ‘Fifth Estate’ that is being enabled 
by the Internet. This new organizational form is comparable to, but potentially more powerful than, the 
Fourth Estate, which developed as a significant force in an earlier period with an independent press 
and other mass media. While the significance of the press and the Internet to democratic governance 
is questioned in all societies, there is particular skepticism of their relevance outside the most liberal 
democratic regimes, which have a relatively free press and more pluralistic political systems, such as 
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in North America and West Europe. Nevertheless, there have been vivid examples of where networked 
individuals have appeared to assert greater communicative power in the politics of governance, the media 
and everyday life, even in non-liberal democratic regimes, such as Hong Kong, and in some cases, China. 
This potential points to the need for more systematic empirical research in a wider variety of economic 
and political settings worldwide, particularly in states in which the Internet might offer a potential for 
more democratic governance and greater accountability of government controlled media. This paper 
examines cases in which networked individuals in China used the Internet to hold governmental and 
press institutions more accountable. The cases provide support for the relevance of the Fifth Estate 
concept in China, and also illuminates the process – showing how the Internet can be used to empower 
networked individuals in more autocratic regimes.
Keywords
fifth estate, 5th estate, China, empowerment, communication, power, democracy
Topic
Internet and politics
China y el quinto poder:  
¿ilusión de la red o potencial democrático?
Resumen
Podría decirse que las sociedades democráticas están asistiendo a la emergencia de un «quinto poder», 
que es posible gracias a internet. Esta nueva forma de organización es comparable al cuarto poder –pero 
potencialmente es más poderosa–, que se desarrolló como una fuerza significativa en una época anterior 
gracias a una prensa independiente y otros medios de comunicación de masa. Aunque la importancia de 
la prensa y de internet para la gobernanza democrática es cuestionada en todas las sociedades, existe un 
particular escepticismo en cuanto a su importancia entre regímenes democráticos más liberales, en los 
que la prensa es relativamente libre y los sistemas políticos son más plurales, por ejemplo Norteamérica y 
Europa occidental. Sin embargo, ha habido destacables ejemplos de lugares donde individuos conectados 
en red han tenido un gran poder comunicativo sobre las políticas de gobierno, los medios de comunicación 
y la vida cotidiana, incluso en regímenes democráticos no liberales, como es Hong Kong y, en ciertos 
casos, China. Este potencial señala la necesidad de una investigación empírica más sistemática en una 
variedad más amplia de escenarios económicos y políticos del mundo, especialmente en estados donde 
internet ofrezca posibilidades para una gobernanza más democrática y para una mayor responsabilidad y 
transparencia de los medios de comunicación controlados por los gobiernos. Este trabajo estudia casos en 
que individuos conectados en red en China utilizaron internet para que instituciones gubernamentales y 
de prensa tuvieran más responsabilidad a la hora de rendir cuentas. Estos casos reafirman la importancia 
del concepto de quinto poder en China, además de alumbrar el proceso, mostrando cómo internet se 
puede utilizar para capacitar a los individuos conectados en red en regímenes más autocráticos.
Palabras clave
quinto poder, 5º poder, China, empoderamiento, comunicación, poder, democracia
Tema
internet y política
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 1.  See: <https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/7206-Can-air-pollution-app-for-smartphone-users-kickstart-new-era-of-
transparency-in-China-> [Accessed: 20 May 2015].
 2. See: <http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/environment/can-pollution-tracking-app-kickstart-transparency> [Accessed: 20 May 2015].
Introduction
In 2015, China’s Premier, Li Keqiang, spoke at a news 
conference following the National People’s Congress, to 
say that the government would address public concerns 
over pollution. This was a response attributed in part to a 
popular documentary, entitled “Under the Dome”. The film 
was produced by a state television producer, but popularized 
rapidly over social media. It pulled together increasing 
evidence that contradicted the government’s own claims 
regarding safe levels of pollution in the major cities. The 
Internet and social media complemented the documentary 
in this case by enabling it to spread widely and very rapidly 
–while the conference was in progress, and before it was 
banned from Websites. Prior to this moment, the Internet 
also was used to providing evidence of pollution levels that 
was relatively independent of governmental control. Large 
numbers of residents in major cities used mobile phone 
environmental apps as sensors to register levels of pollution.1 
Readings from these apps could then be aggregated to 
provide real-time reports on pollution levels based on 
this collective intelligence, which often contradicted more 
positive reports by governmental authorities. This led to 
more accountable agencies being established to monitor 
pollution levels in a more transparent and comparative 
manner, such as by ranking cities.2
The Question
Are such instances evidence of the potential for the Internet 
to enable more democratic forms of accountability, or an 
illusion of democracy? The potential of the Internet as a 
tool for democratic empowerment has been widely debated 
and researched, particularly in the aftermath of the series 
of protests and demonstrations across the Middle East that 
has been called the Arab Spring. Critics of the Internet 
supporting this democratic potential have argued that 
this technology can be used more effectively by autocratic 
regimes to reinforce their power, such as through even 
more powerful tools for state surveillance than is possible 
by networked citizens, or “netizens” (e.g., Morozov, 2011). 
This is in line with the long-term view that information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) are sufficiently malleable 
that their adoption and implementation will tend to reinforce 
existing structures of power and influence rather than open 
up the potential for shifting power to new actors (Danziger 
et al., 1982). 
However, there is evidence in a growing number of cases 
where networked individuals have been able to use the 
Internet to challenge powerful institutions, such as by 
having greater access to information and also the ability 
to expose information in ways that can hold the powerful 
more accountable, such as in the case of Wikileaks. This 
potential has led to the concept of a new “Fifth Estate” role 
that the Internet can enable (Dutton, 1999, 2010, 2013, 2015).
The Idea of a Fifth Estate
This perspective on the Internet’s political implications for 
the politics of governance, the media and everyday life 
is that networked individuals are able to use the Internet 
and related information and communication technologies 
to perform a “Fifth Estate” function that is analogous to 
the role of the press in an earlier era. A distinctive aspect 
of this perspective is that it is not anchored in conceptions 
of institutional change. That is, unlike conceptions of 
cyber- or e-democracy, the Fifth Estate does not depend 
on governmental institutions using the Internet to 
transform themselves into more democratic institutions, 
such as by using more direct forms of democratic control, 
like referendums or electronic voting and polling. Instead, 
networked individuals can create and obtain information 
resources through the Internet, that are outside of and more 
independent of existing institutions, thereby creating a more 
pluralistic basis of accountability, literally enabling them to 
speak the truth to power. 
However, most studies of the Internet and democracy 
are anchored in liberal democratic political systems with 
a relatively free press, independent judiciaries and some 
separation of powers. The same is true for studies of the 
Fifth Estate. While a growing number of studies have 
focused on the role of the Internet in the politics of the 
media in China, such as focusing on such issues as the 
impact of blogging on the press, they have not focused 
on holding other institutions, such as the government, 
more accountable (Zheng, 2007; Yang, 2009; Shirk, 2011; 
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Hassid, 2012). Few studies in China have focused on more 
conventional initiatives around democratic reform, given 
they are so rare, and none have viewed activities from the 
perspective of the Fifth Estate. In fact, to many scholars of 
politics in China, the lack of a liberal democratic tradition 
and institutions in China is likely to negate the potential for 
the emergence of a Fifth Estate role of the Internet. 
Approach of this Study
This article seeks to challenge the view that a Fifth Estate 
could not emerge in China, seen as a non-liberal democratic 
state that has taken an aggressive role in controlling the 
media and Internet use. Case studies in China are used to 
elaborate this potential, such as the role of searching and 
networking by networked individuals, for which blogging 
is one of many tools, and also to advance understanding 
of its dynamics in a nation where the emergence of a 
Fifth Estate would not have been anticipated, given strict 
state controls of the media. This study suggests that the 
concept of the Fifth Estate is indeed relevant to China, 
and also illuminates the processes that enabled networked 
individuals to use the Internet in ways that enhanced their 
communicative power. 
China is becoming a key focus of Internet studies because 
of governmental efforts to control Internet content, but also 
because it has become the nation with the largest number of 
users, exceeding 642 million by 2015.3 Three cases in China 
were chosen because each was widely reputed to have been 
reshaped by the public’s use of the Internet. These cases not 
only support the utility of the concept of a Fifth Estate in the 
context of China, but also further an understanding of the 
dynamics that enable the Fifth Estate to empower networked 
individuals. In all three cases, Internet users became involved 
when traditional mechanisms of consultation, state media, 
and news reporting did not meet the expectations of a set 
of networked individuals. Networked individuals played 
a Fifth Estate role in each case by holding the press or 
governmental institutions more accountable, primarily by 
sourcing their own information and reframing issues in ways 
that engaged more actors. They were able to change the 
scope of conflict in ways that reflected a key aspect of E. 
E. Schattschneider’s (1960) conception of the dynamics of 
political conflict – an extreme case of his conception of the 
“semi-sovereign people”. 
The following section briefly sketches the idea of a Fifth Estate 
and the patterns of findings that led to its formulation. This 
is followed by an overview of the methodological approach 
of this study before describing the three case studies. The 
final sections reflect back on these case studies to elaborate 
the application of the Fifth Estate in the context of China, 
and its relationship to how Schattschneider’s notions can 
be brought into the digital age in a nondemocratic context. 
Of course, it is impossible to generalize beyond these cases 
to the larger context of China, particularly given that they 
are atypical or extreme cases. Nevertheless, as critical 
cases, they provide an empirical approach to developing a 
better understanding of the Fifth Estate and how networked 
individuals can indeed be empowered even in states without 
a relatively independent press or open Internet. These cases 
and our interpretations can advance theory as they are 
critically assessed and elaborated by further cases and related 
empirical research in China and other networked nations. 
The Fifth Estate Perspective 
There are competing conceptions of the role the Internet 
can play in (dis)empowering citizens, ranging from the 
Internet being irrelevant clicktivism (Bennett et al., 1999), 
inherently democratic or anti-democratic (de Sola Pool 
1983), or socially shaped to reinforce existing structures 
of control (Danziger et al., 1982; Morozov, 2011). A variation 
of this reinforcement position is a new perspective on the 
politics of the Internet, which has been conceptualized as 
enabling a Fifth Estate. 
From this Fifth Estate perspective, the communicative 
power of networked individuals is being reinforced by the 
ways they can use the Internet to source information and 
form networks in ways that can hold other actors more 
accountable, in ways that are comparable in significance 
to the rise of the Fourth Estate in an earlier era. They are 
not transforming existing democratic institutions, such as 
public consultation, but adding a new and more independent 
source for creating, networking, and providing information 
resources that can challenge existing institutions. 
Early research on the power shifts associated with the 
adoption and use of computing in organizations, found 
 3.  See World Internet Stats at: <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm#asia> [Accessed: 21 May 2015].
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computers were used in ways that tended to follow and 
reinforce existing structures of power and influence 
(Danziger et al., 1982). This perspective remains prominent, 
such as in the influential work of Evgeny Morozov (2011), 
and Jan Van Dijk (2012). Morozov, for example, argued that 
the political context of Internet use drives its implications. 
From his perspective, in many nations the Internet will 
be controlled by autocrats in ways that will follow and 
reinforce their influence, rather than being used as a tool 
for democratic empowerment – which he characterized 
as a “net delusion” (Morozov, 2011). While his work was 
published before the Arab uprisings, it remains an influential 
perspective, and has been lent some support by the longer-
term reversals of the democratic uprisings supported by 
networked individuals. The ability of networked individuals 
to sustain activity overtime is a serious issue limiting the 
capacity of a Fifth Estate (Dutton and Lin, 2001).
However, one major problem with this reinforcement 
perspective is that the Internet is a huge, complex, and 
global technical system that is increasingly impossible for 
any single actor to control (Dutton et al., 2012). This makes 
reinforcement politics more problematic. A more inductive 
perspective on the role of the Internet has focused on 
observing actual patterns of use and impact to determine 
what kinds of power shifts emerge in practice. This inductive 
approach led to early conceptions of reinforcement politics 
in organizations, such as local governments (Danziger et al., 
1982). However, the development and use of the Internet 
over the ensuing decades raise questions over the degree 
that autocrats, organizations or nations can continue to 
exercise control over the development and impact of globally 
networked ICTs like the Internet and related social media. 
Like the social shaping perspective on ICTs, the concept of 
a Fifth Estate is not technologically deterministic. It focuses 
on the technical, social and political contexts of use, but it 
also does not presume that existing structures of power and 
influence are simply reinforced, given the global ecology 
of actors that are shaping the Internet and its implications 
in a variety of intended and unanticipated ways. From an 
empirical, inductive perspective, research has documented 
a developing pattern of findings that support the role of the 
Internet in empowering networked individuals in ways that 
they can counter existing institutions, such as governments 
and the press (Dutton 2007, 2009, 2010; Newman et al., 2012). 
In particular, users of the Internet have increasingly brought 
the Internet into their work and everyday life in more central 
ways that provide them with more independence from any 
single institution, such as a local government or the media. 
They go to the Internet as a first port of call for information, 
rather than going to a particular place– to a global space 
of flows rather than a local space of places (Castells, 2004, 
pp. 11-12). Moreover, they do not go to specific sites, but 
most often find content through search engines or social 
networks, which refer them to information of most relevance 
to their interests. While new algorithms and search histories 
might limit the openness of search, this management of 
search is one element of a strategy for limiting or enlarging 
the role of the Internet in supporting networked individuals.
In addition, networked individuals have a learned level of 
trust in the information they source, which is comparable 
to, if not greater than what they learn from the press or 
broadcasting (Blank and Dutton, 2011). In China, for example, 
reliance on the Internet for information is in many respects 
more prominent than in the US and other liberal democracies 
in which people can have greater trust in the mass media 
(Dutton et al., 2013).
The concept of the Fifth Estate envisions the Internet 
as a platform through which networked individuals can 
perform a useful democratic role in holding institutions 
such as the media and government more accountable. 
Networked individuals can source their own information, 
independent of any single institution, using the capabilities 
provided by search and social media. Also, users can 
create their own content in many forms, from monitoring 
pollution levels with an environmental app to posting 
photos on blogs, to commenting on websites, providing 
even greater independence from other institutions and 
offering a mechanism whereby public opinion can be directly 
expressed. 
This individually sourced or distributed content can bypass 
or be amplified by the traditional mass media of the Fourth 
Estate, such as in the case of ‘Under the Dome’, but in doing 
so it can fulfil many of the same functions of holding the 
activities of government, business and other institutions up 
to the light of a networked public. In such ways, the Fifth 
Estate is distinct from the mainstream of media studies 
that focus on the relationships between mass media and 
blogging, such as in setting agendas (Hassid, 2012). From a 
Fifth Estate perspective, the Internet is not viewed simply as 
a new medium, but as a platform that can be used by media 
institutions but also by networked individuals to challenge 
the media and play a potentially important political role, yet 
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without the institutional foundations of the Fourth Estate. 
It is composed of the distributed activities of one or many 
individuals acting on their own or collaboratively but in 
a more decentralized network. This means that it is not 
equivalent to a social movement. Revolving sets of networked 
individuals can hold the leadership of social movements 
accountable like other institutional authorities in ways 
enabled by the Internet (Dutton, 2009; Newman et al., 2011). 
The Dynamics of the Fifth Estate:  
An Old Perspective on a New Phenomenon
This Fifth Estate perspective guided our approach to the 
case studies noted above. Its dynamics will be developed 
further in this article in light of the cases. However, in the 
course of our early efforts to understand the dynamics 
of the Fifth Estate in the context of our cases, we were 
reminded of E. E. Schattschneider’s (1960) perspective on 
the dynamics of political conflicts. His ideas are based on 
traditional political strategies in liberal democratic politics 
– not on the politics of the Internet in authoritarian regimes. 
Therefore, his notions around the ‘semi-sovereign people’ 
are most often reflected in mass media research around 
the role of agenda-setting and issue-framing (McLeod and 
Detenber, 1999). And work on agenda setting has proven 
to be of value in the context of China, with its active 
blogging communities (Shirk 2011; Hassid 2012). However, 
Schattschneider’s original conception linked agenda setting 
and framing, as conceptualized in contemporary research, 
more directly to the outcome of political conflict. It therefore 
provided a useful language for discussing the role of the 
Fifth Estate, as will be described in the case studies. 
Essentially, Schattschneider (1960, p. 1) argued that the 
central aspect of politics in a liberal democratic society is 
that conflict can spread or exhibit ‘contagiousness’. The 
importance of this is captured by his analogy between 
politics and spectator sports, except – he points out – in 
the game of politics, the spectators can join in the game 
at any time and on any side. And the outcome of the game 
or political conflict is shaped by the extent to which the 
spectators become involved and on what side they choose 
to join in. This dynamic makes the most important strategy 
of politics is for contestants to control the scope of a conflict. 
This is one reason why traditional political institutions place 
much effort in controlling communication. They do not want 
to accidentally create issues that bring more people into a 
conflict as it could have unpredictable consequences on 
the outcome.
For example, if someone is winning a contest, they would 
want to retain the present scope of conflict, and keep all 
the spectators in the stands. In contrast, it is in the interest 
of those losing a conflict to broaden the scope, since they 
have nothing more to lose and can open up the possibility of 
more spectators joining their side in the conflict and thereby 
create the potential for a more positive outcome. The scope 
of the conflict can be changed by socializing or drawing the 
attention of more people to the conflict (agenda-setting), 
or changing the issue (re-framing), which can lead some 
spectators to join a particular side or for some contestants 
to switch sides. This simple analogy provides a powerful 
perspective on why the Internet can play a pivotal role in the 
political process. But for networked individuals to use the 
Internet to shape the scope of conflict, they need alternative 
channels of communication, such as a blog, that are not 
controlled by those winning the game. It also requires the 
ability to source credible information that is independent 
of the media and other institutions that are shaping the 
agenda. As you follow the cases described below, you can 
see the ways in which networked individuals played this role 
in reconfiguring the scope of conflict.
Mini-Cases of an Emerging  
Fifth Estate Role
Given countervailing expectations on the role of the Internet, 
along with a prevailing theme of state control being likely 
to marginalize the significance of the Internet in politics, 
we were captivated by stories of the Internet being used 
effectively within states, such as China, which is among the 
nations which have the highest levels of regulation of online 
expression (Deibert et al., 2010). For example, in July of 2011, 
when 40 people were killed in a high-speed train collision in 
Wenzhou, in the Zhejiang province of China, governmental 
efforts to constrain media coverage of this accident soon led 
to critical coverage online and in the press (Areddy and Yang, 
2011). The Internet is not expected to enable the formation 
of an independent base of political and social accountability, 
in states that do not have an independent press (Bennett, 
2010) but also control Internet use, such as through Internet 
content filtering and the control of users, e.g., through the 
arrest of bloggers. Nevertheless, events such as those that 
followed the Wenzhou speed train incident suggest that 
scholars cannot dismiss the Internet and the media’s role in 
states like China, which merit further exploration. Moreover, 
key studies of the Internet in China reinforce the potential 
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for networked individuals to be empowered in this context 
(Yang, 2009; Shirk, 2011). 
The Context: Content Regulation in China 
China has become a primary example of a state with 
a controlled press, where a number of government 
organizations have combined to regulate media content, 
despite demands for better news coverage (Shirk, 2010). At 
the highest level, the Communist Party’s Central Propaganda 
Department (CPD) is responsible for oversight of the media. 
In practice, the CPD works in collaboration with other 
government bodies, such as the General Administration of 
Press and Publication (GAPP) and the State Administration 
of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT). Together, they 
produce guidelines to instruct the work of media outlets 
across the country. For example, news reporting about 
politically sensitive events is strictly forbidden (Bennett, 
2010). However, these guidelines are not sufficiently public 
or explicit to eliminate ambiguity over what for example, 
might be viewed as politically sensitive. Experienced media 
practitioners are expected to know where to draw the line, 
but such self-regulation often leads news organizations to err 
on the side of over-regulation and censure of questionable 
news reporting (Stern and O’Brien, 2011). 
These regulatory guidelines have been applied to the 
news services on the Web, social media, mobile phones, 
and related ICTs. However, more government organizations 
are involved in monitoring and censorship of the online 
world (Zhao, 2009). Beyond CPD, GAPP, and SARFT, these 
include: the State Council Information Office (SCIO), which 
has the power of licensing agencies in putting original 
news online, and also oversees websites that feed from 
these approved news agencies; the Ministry of Information 
Industry (MII), which is responsible for the supervision of 
the telecommunication infrastructure such as international 
gateway systems and text message jamming (Zhao, 2009); 
the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the State Secrecy 
Bureau and China’s Judiciary, which can monitor websites, 
and track and investigate users that threaten online security 
(Anon, 2009); and the Ministry of Culture (MC), which 
plays a key role in making policies and enforcing laws and 
regulations to direct the mainstream culture in line with the 
priorities of the CPD. These organizations are integrated in 
ways that are designed to implement the guidance provided 
by the Communist Party. However, given the number of 
agencies involved, and the existence of still other regulatory 
regimes, such as those regulating mobile phone services, 
many of which might have competing views on the same 
issues, there remains a level of uncertainty over content 
regulation, particularly at the local level. Nevertheless, as 
described here, China has a strong regulatory regime aimed 
towards controlling the press and mass media, including 
the Internet and related social media, making exceptions 
to state control notable. 
Selection of Mini-Cases
Three case studies were selected because of their notoriety 
as examples in which the Internet seemed to play a significant 
role in government and politics. The cases included an 
effort to block the Xiamen Paraxylene (PX) petrochemical 
project; challenges to the failures in reporting of a gas 
explosion in Nanjing; and uncovering an expense claims 
scandal by judicial officials. They are not purported to be 
a representative sample or in-depth participant observer 
case studies. To the contrary, they are exceptional or critical 
cases, in three different areas of policy, and examined in 
a focused way to determine whether there was sufficient 
evidence of a Fifth Estate role. Each seemed significant 
as well by virtue of involving the allocation of resources 
with redistributive consequences. Buildings were not built, 
individuals were fired, public officials were disciplined. 
Tangible resources were at stake in non-trivial ways. 
Sources of Evidence and Empirical Methods  
of Observation
Because the cases we studied appeared to counter 
conventional expectations, our research initially sought to 
critically question whether these accounts were credible 
or simply new urban myths. In each case we found them 
substantiated by multiple sources of evidence, ranging from 
multiple journalistic accounts to interviews with participants 
and observers, as described and referenced below. As 
importantly, we sought to understand how the Internet was 
able to effect change, despite state oversight and control 
of online expression in China. 
The cases were explored in stages. We first systematically 
surveyed press and blog coverage at several levels. We 
began with searches for articles related to each of the three 
cases in the Chinese database of newspapers archived by 
the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). This 
coverage enabled us to identify the course of events for each 
case as well as points of contention. Using and extrapolating 
from the key words within these reports, we then searched 
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the major Chinese blog, BBS, and microblog platforms, such 
as SinaWeibo, Sina Blog, Sohu Blog, Net Ease and Tianya 
BBS, for additional material related to each case. We found 
the posts often referring to local online forums or other 
pieces of information about these cases such as video posts 
on Youku, so they were included in our dataset and analysis.4
This background information provided the basic narrative of 
each case. The lead Chinese author then e-mailed selected 
participants, such as bloggers and reporters involved in each 
of the events in order to request additional details, validate 
reports, and generate links to other participants. This 
approach led to direct communication with key participants, 
interviewed primarily over the Internet or by phone. Key 
sources of major factual claims and observations relevant 
to each case are cited in the text and associated notes, with 
the permission of those interviewed. We have only included 
the names of reporters and bloggers who have given their 
permission, and who are well known by their role in the 
cases. Otherwise, we do not report the actual names of 
bloggers or individuals interviewed. 
The next sections describe each mini-case. We call them 
“mini-cases” since we were not able to conduct the level 
of detailed participant-observation that we would have in 
a full case study, limited by the sensitivity of the cases and 
topics. After describing the cases, we offer a number of 
general observations on some of their cross-cutting themes. 
Cases of a Fifth Estate in China
Blocking an Environmentally Hazardous Plant: 
the Xiamen PX Project
In 2007, the residents of Xiamen, a port city in Fujian Province 
in south-eastern China, halted the proposed construction of 
a local chemical plant, intended for production of paraxylene 
(PX), a petrochemical used in manufacturing polyester and 
other fabrics. The construction site was seven kilometres 
from the city centre and less than 1.5 kilometres from a 
residential area with two universities and thousands of 
residents (Xie, 2007). Similar projects had been built further 
from city centres, often by seventy or more kilometres. 
Residents opposed the PX project as a threat to their 
seaside environment, and used the Internet in multiple 
ways to express their opposition, including online activism 
- clicktivism, text message campaigns, and the orchestration 
of peaceful demonstrations. 
The project had obtained approvals from the central 
government and the State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA) in 2004 and 2005, respectively. 
Moreover, the National Development and Reform 
Commission identified it as one of seven crucial PX projects 
of the nation’s Eleventh Five-year Plan. Therefore, despite 
concerns expressed by local residents, one of the most 
important industrial projects in Xiamen’s history was 
launched on 17 November 2006. An official report of the 
company said that this project was symbolic of Xiamen rising 
to the status of a world-class petrochemical giant.5
After the project’s approval was announced, environmental 
experts, including noted academics, repeated concerns over 
its impact and called for the project to be stopped. During 
two subsequent congresses, the National People’s Congress 
(NPC), and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) in 2007, 105 members jointly signed 
the ‘Proposal of Moving the Xiamen Haicang PX Project’. 
One of them, Zhao Yufen, a member of the Chinese Academy 
of Sciences (CAS) and a professor of Xiamen University, 
stated in a published interview that: “PX is a dangerous, 
highly carcinogenic chemical that can cause a high rate of 
fetal deformities” (Qu, 2007).
Also, local media in Xiamen featured regular reports on 
the project, focusing on the environmental issues. These 
were augmented by bloggers. One famous online activist, 
Zhong Xiaoyong, in his persona as the blogger Lian Yue, 
posted a series of blogs on this project– with titles such 
as “Environmental protection officials who can not protect 
the environment”, and “What are the people of Xiamen 
supposed to do!”. He suggested simple actions that individual 
citizens could take in order to oppose the proposed siting 
of the plant, sent many messages about the health risks, 
 4.  Most of the sources were surveyed during the period from August to December 2010, but followed up after the initial studies and a repeated 
series of revisions of each case, which added materials to the cases. The complete collection of the anonymized sources can be made 
available upon request.
 5.  Reporting to the Secretary General, available at: <http://www.xm.gov.cn/xmyw/200701/t20070114_151080.htm> [Accessed: 22 December, 
2010].
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and reassured the public that they would be safe from 
retribution. He blogged: “Don’t be afraid’ and that there is 
‘no need to commit any acts of bravery” (Kennedy, 2010). 
On 15 March 2007, a blog called “Haicang, My Home” was 
set up by Xiamen residents, on which they posted dramatic 
pleas, such as “The cries of residents of Xiamen City, Fujian 
province — please save our rights to live!”. The blog stated:
[…] every time we call the police or the environmental 
protection hotline, the answer we are given is that someone will 
be coming right away to see if the plant is operating properly 
or not. […] Yet the residents have not received any data on 
the pollution, nor monitoring of the air quality index, since 
the district was established three years ago. Xiamen has air 
quality forecasts done every day, yet the only area overlooked 
is Haicang District. We just want fresh air! Smells that are strong 
enough to wake people up in the middle of the night do no harm 
to the body? Even when the Fujian provincial environmental 
protection agency teamed up with the Xiamen city government 
environmental protection agency in September to carry out 
a three-day monitoring of air quality in Haicang, the result 
was that hydrogen sulphide levels and the strength of stench 
exceeded national standards (report available at the city and 
district environmental protection agencies).6
On 28 May 2007, Wang Yongjun, who had been a journalist 
for the Xiamen Bureau of the Xinhua News Agency, posted 
an article online to persuade residents to send out an anti-
pollution SMS (Short Message Service) at Oeeee.com,7 
using a ID of Xiamen Wave.8 The pronunciation of this ID 
in the Fujian native dialect is exactly the same as for a 
Xiamen resident, making it readily memorable. When it was 
published in the Southern Metropolitan Daily, the article 
received attention from other national media and national 
portal sites, which immediately reported the article on their 
front pages. More than 10,000 comments were posted in 
response to Xiamen Wave’s article, and it registered a click 
rate of nearly 57,000, as thousands of Xiamen residents were 
circulating the same SMS message. The text message read: 
[T]he Xianglu Group has invested in a PX project in Haicang 
District. Should this highly toxic chemical product be 
manufactured, it would be like dropping an atomic bomb on 
Xiamen Island; it would mean that, in the future, the people 
of Xiamen would live in the shadow of leukemia and deformed 
children. We want to live....when you see this SMS please sent it 
to all of your friends in Xiamen! (Lan and Zhang, 2007)
On 28 May 2007, in response to the online activity, the Chief 
of the Environment Protection Bureau of Xiamen responded 
to questions on the potential environmental problems in 
the Xiamen Daily. The next day, the general manager of 
the Xiamen PX Project, Lin Yingzong, published an article 
in the Xiamen Evening Newspaper, explaining the safety 
measures being taken by the PX project. During a brief news 
conference on 30 May, Xiamen’s first Deputy Mayor, Ding 
Guoyan, announced that the construction of the PX project 
would be postponed and that the Xiamen government would 
begin a process of public consultation, including the use of 
the mayor’s hot line, email, text messaging, telephone, fax, 
and post in order to obtain the views of citizens. 
Nevertheless, many residents were dissatisfied with the 
Xiamen government’s response, arguing that officials were 
more concerned with public relations than a change in policy. 
Many netizens received messages issued from a popular 
local bulletin board system (BBS), Xiaoyu Community online, 
which called for a ‘walk’ (San Bu) to the City Hall. However, 
on 30 May, access to the Xiaoyu BBS was blocked with a 
notification which read: “[T]he community is temporarily 
closed for a program upgrade”. According to one user of 
the Xiaoyu Community BBS, they had all received an email 
from the BBS administrator that instructed them not to post 
anything related to the PX project.9
Nevertheless, and possibly caused if not inspired by this 
effort to block communication, information about the walk 
continued to be widely distributed and the demonstration 
proceeded as planned. On 1 June 2007, many citizens 
demonstrated in the city centre under the supervision 
 6.  “The cries of residents of Xiamen city, Fujian province — please save our rights to live!” <http://blog.sina.com.cn/haicangpx> [Accessed: 24 
December, 2010], English translation is available at: <http://globalvoicesonline.org/2007/04/07/china-inner-city-toxics-plant-protested/> 
[Accessed: 24 December, 2010]
 7.  The article was entitled “Anti-pollution! Xiamen million residents, let’s send out the same SMS”. The original one has been deleted online, 
and a part of this article is available at: <http://news.163.com/07/1220/15/405QUSCN0001124J.html> [Accessed: 24 December, 2010]
 8.  Oeeee.com (Aoyi Wang), representing “omniscience-eye”, is operated by Nanfang Daily Media Group, one of the most influencing media 
corporation in China. Beside Oeeee.com, the Group also runs Nanfang Daily, Southern Metropolitan Daily and Southern Weekend.
 9.  Ibid.
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of police. A few netizens posted live reports of the 
demonstration on their blogs, using their mobile phones 
and software to send text messages onto the Internet. 
Traditional media, by contrast, were virtually silent about 
the demonstration.
Wen Yunchao, known as Beifeng in his blog, and who was 
participating in the protest, posted several live reports. 
Conversations regarding the protest between Beifeng 
and other netizens were extensive, running to over 9,000 
Chinese characters. Most of the blog posts were short, 
but they were vivid and conveyed detailed descriptions of 
unfolding events: reporting where people were heading, 
what banners participants were holding, what slogans 
they were shouting, the estimated number of police 
and participants, and the rumours of the government’s 
response. They were circulating among participants 
during the protest. For example, Wen Younchao wrote: “In 
front of city hall”. – “I guess there are over ten thousand 
people’- ‘No route was planned before, so it was a little bit 
chaotic”.10 And he argued that: “The development of the 
new media technology has made it impossible to block all 
the information”.11
On the 1 and 3 June 2007, the Xiamen government 
broadcasted mass text messages to all citizens, announcing 
that the PX project had been postponed and that the 
government would soon provide more information channels 
in order to hear the views of residents, such as via cell phones 
and the Internet. Then, on 7 June, the Xiamen government 
said that whether or not to continue construction of the PX 
project would be determined through another environmental 
assessment. 
Six months later, on 5 December 2007, the environmental 
assessment report concluded that the Haicang District was 
too small to have both a petrochemical plant, particularly 
when sited near a residential area. Three days later, the 
Xiamen government opened a voting platform on its website 
– but it was taken down after only one day. When the poll 
was closed on the following day, 55,376 of the 58,454 votes 
cast were against the project. However, the managers of the 
website dismissed the overwhelmingly negative vote, saying 
they had neglected to take account of the fact that multiple 
votes might come from the same IP address. It did not accept 
the vote and abandoned the idea of polling residents. 
On 13 and 14 December, the Xiamen government held two 
separate meetings inviting representatives of the Xiamen 
residents to discuss the PX project. Over 80 percent of 
the participants voted against the PX project during the 
meetings. Finally, on 16 December 2007, the PX project was 
suspended by the authorities. Rather than being stopped, 
it was announced that the project would be moved to 
Zhangzhou, a neighbouring city to Xiamen in Fujian.
Holding News Media to Account:  
the Nanjing Gas Explosion
On 28 July 2010, in Nanjing, the capital of Jiangsu 
Province, a pipe burst that was carrying flammable gas. 
The leak exploded at 10.15 am when the leaking gas was 
ignited by a kitchen flame at a nearby restaurant (Yang and 
Shangguan, 2010). The explosion was said to be the largest 
recorded since 1949, and could be felt 10 kilometres away 
(Wang and Luan, 2010). The next day, after investigation 
of the incident, the police downplayed it and blamed 
the explosion on a construction company that failed to 
meet necessary building safety standards.12 According to 
an official of the State Administration for Work Safety, 
“due to illegal sub-contracting and lack of supervision, 
the construction did not meet safety standards” (Toloken 
and Sun, 2010). 
Reports on the incident by several local newspapers 
contained a number of inconsistencies that were challenged 
by netizens (Ju, Hu and Wang, 2011). One blogger, ‘Nanjing 
Lao Cui’, took photos of the front pages of six local 
newspapers on 29 July and posted them on his blog (Nanjing 
Lao Cui, 2010). As his blog argued, the press tended to bury 
news coverage of the event. His blog showed that only one 
paper, Modern Express, a newspaper run by a national 
news agency, reported the explosion, but placed it on the 
 10.  Full text of live report is on Wen Yunchao’s blog, available at: <http://www.bullogger.com/blogs/wenyc1230/archives/69959.aspx> [Accessed: 
25 December, 2010].
 11.  Wen Yunchao, word document with title of “Xiamen from Beginning to End” attached to email entitled “re: Xiamen PX Project” to Sun 
Huan, 11 November, 2010. Cited with permission.
 12.  Multiple companies were involved in the construction, and in this case, a qualified contractor signed a subcontract with a company, which 
caused the explosion, and was judged as unqualified.
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back cover. No other major newspaper in the city had the 
explosion in a featured position, such as on their front or 
back page. Nanjing MorningNews, which is attached to 
Xinhua Daily and owned by the provincial party committee, 
did not refer to the explosion at all in its first six pages. 
Nanjing Daily,Yangtze Evening News and Jinling Evening 
News all led with news of a plane crash in Pakistan, and 
photos of the plane crash occupied over half of the Nanjing 
Daily’s front page. 
However, online networks developed the story of the 
explosion, with pictures of the explosion diffusing rapidly 
online. Unlike the delayed and inconsistent newspaper 
reports, netizens were quick to cover the incident by using 
the Internet, blogs, and other ICTs, with much coverage on 
micro-blogs available within an hour of the explosion. Then, 
a report of the explosion, which included video and pictures, 
was posted on a BBS, which was soon cross-posted on many 
other major BBSs in China, such as one entitled, “Big Blast 
in the North of Nanjing”.13
There was no official report about the number of people 
who were injured by the explosion. However, the hospitals in 
Nanjing announced that they had run out of blood supplies 
in the aftermath of the explosion and were in urgent need 
of donors. A tweet that encouraged Nanjing residents to 
donate blood was cross-posted over 5000 times (He, 2010). 
Perhaps the most incredible instance was when bloggers 
shared a video clip within which a government official was 
seen to have interrupted the live reporting of the explosion 
on the Jiangsu City Channel.14 He was reported to have said: 
“Who gave you permission to broadcast live?” This question 
was circulated widely on the Internet (Tan 2010, p. A08).
This is one of the only concrete statements coming from 
a government official, but it spoke volumes. Most of the 
traditional broadcast media kept silent the next day, but 
the explosion continued to be discussed on the following 
day and long after on many local BBSs and microblogs 
(He, 2010).
In the aftermath of the explosion, a news article, entitled 
‘Governmental Journalism in Crisis’, was published in 
the People’s Daily by Ye Hao (2010), the minister of the 
public relations department of Nanjing. Essentially, he 
acknowledged that every citizen can be a journalist in 
the era of the Internet, and argued that blocking media 
coverage is wrong and ineffective in the digital age. Ye Hao 
specifically noted that: “After a crisis, we used to fear the 
media would bring chaos, leading to public panic and that 
it would create a negative image of the government, but in 
fact it is exactly the opposite”. Taking the Nanjing explosion 
as an example, he said that well before the government had 
time to send a press release, false and misleading rumours 
had already been spread widely online. His argument 
was that if the government were to publish information 
as soon as possible, even in real-time, there would be a 
greater likelihood of diminishing unfounded rumours and 
misinformation. Every incident, according to Ye Hao, has 
been teaching the government to be more sophisticated in 
handling information, and that it should move toward more 
open disclosure of information as its standard approach 
(Ye, 2010).
Holding Public Officials Accountable: 
Challenging a Publicly Funded Visit
On 3 June 2009, bloggers posted more than ten internal 
government documents regarding a public-funded overseas 
visit by six officials from the Guangzhou Maritime Court 
(Ye 2009, p. 7).The documents included: a request to the 
foreign affairs office of Guangzhou People’s government; a 
report of the tour to South Africa and other countries; and 
the record of a conversation held on an intranet platform. 
According to the report, from 7 January to 18 January, 2009, 
six officials of the court took an eleven-day study trip to 
survey developments in South Africa, Egypt, and Turkey via 
the United Arabic Emirates.15, 16 During the trip, they spent 
RMB 480,000 (over US $75,000). It was argued that this 
expense claim was much higher than the regular travel 
expenses for travel to those countries, but the documents 
 13.   “Big Blast in the North of Nanjing”, 28 July, 2010, posted on Sina BBS, available at: <http://nj.bbs.house.sina.com.cn/thread-5118927-1.html> 
[Accessed: 27 December, 2010]
 14.  “A Chinese Official Disallowed Live Broadcasting While on Live TV”, 28 July, 2010, video file, available at: <http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=-ffp5V_HTEE> [Accessed: 27 December, 2010].
 15.  “How The Member Make Up The Aboard Study Report”, June 3rd, 2009, available at: <http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/
free/1/1581756.shtml> [Accessed: 3 January 2011].
 16.  How The Member Make Up The Aboard Study Report”, June 3rd, 2009, available at: <http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/free/1/1581756.
shtml> [Accessed: 3 January 2011].
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also raised questions over whether the purpose of the trip 
was accurately reported. 
One of the documents posted online described the 
importance and urgency of the visit, justifying it by stating: 
“in recent years, judicial cases related to oil pollution at 
sea have been increasing, with lots of victims, high claims 
of compensation and more related to foreign affairs… oil 
contamination and land-based pollution are great threats 
to sea, beach and harbour, which has a great impact on 
residents’ lives, arousing intense public concern. Resolving 
marine pollution disputes has a major impact on protection 
of the marine environment, development of the marine 
economy, and protection of people’s legal rights”. Therefore, 
the report wrote, “Our court plans to accept the invitation 
from courts of Johannesburg, South Africa, and an 
association of lawyers in Cairo, Egypt, and local courts in 
Istanbul, Turkey, to conduct research during a 12 day trip”.
The group planned to conduct research on “how to 
understand and enforce international conventions when 
dealing with oil spill and pollution cases; understand their 
domestic legal systems, clarify jurisdiction over marine 
pollution, identify appropriate application of law and 
statutes on particular subjects; and the subjects of liability, 
damage assessment, insurance and payment, arbitration of 
oil pollution cases, and the functions of organizations, such 
as the Cairo lawyers association, etc”.
These were legitimate aims, but netizens drew attention 
to the report of this trip as lacking genuine findings or 
insights on the matters that were used to justify the travel. 
Much of the report described the basic geography of the 
countries, which was far from the purpose of their mission 
and available without travelling to these locations. Some 
highlighted that the report had simply copied extracts of 
text from other articles, and they underlined sentences that 
bloggers suspected to have been simply cut and pasted 
from newspaper articles or induction materials given by 
various overseas agencies. Several activist netizens also 
revealed more information about these officials, which 
raised questions about the adequacy of their resumes and a 
number of controversial cases that they had been in charge 
of resolving.
Most telling was that the report had no explicit description of 
“maritime oil pollution and land-based pollution problems”. 
Instead it wrote: “in Johannesburg we visited the District 
Court. The Chief Judge gave us a warm reception and invited 
us to attend the trial he is in charge of”; “In the outskirts 
of Cairo we saw rivers full of garbage”; and in Istanbul, “we 
visited a local court, and attended the hearings”. In addition, 
one blog-post showed the conversation on an intranet 
platform between members of the court. One official left 
a message for another saying, “I have searched for a long 
time but did not find detailed information on the ship oil 
pollution lawsuit in South Africa and other two countries. 
Sorry, I have to send it like this…” suggesting that much of 
the research was desk or Internet research, and not done on 
the ground or in ways that required a visit of the delegation. 
On 10 June 2009, the Court held a news conference stating 
that “this overseas visit went through a strict process of 
application in accordance with the time, route and agenda, 
and was approved by higher level officials”. It also stated 
that “the cost of this visit, RMB 480,000, did not exceed 
the budget” (Hong and Liang 2009). These responses led to 
another round of critiques, which lasted for several months. 
On 15 October 2009, Luo Guohua, Chief Judge of Guangzhou 
Maritime Court, was fired. 
Cross-Cutting Patterns and Themes
These mini-cases reveal clear illustrations of how networked 
individuals – netizens – can play a Fifth Estate role. Netizens 
were able to source information, network with others, and 
widely distribute information that challenged more powerful 
institutions and actors. By speaking and networking the 
truth in ways that countered misinformation and politically 
oriented communication strategies, netizens were able 
to hold government agencies, mass media, and judicial 
agencies accountable in ways that influenced real decisions 
and actions. While limited to three mini-cases, the role of 
netizens were so obviously instrumental in each case that it 
is clear that networked individuals in China can – on occasion 
– provide a basis for more democratic accountability. 
This section briefly describes a number of patterns and 
themes across these cases that help illuminate the political 
dynamics of the Fifth Estate and the role of what might be 
called the semi-sovereign netizen. 
The Role of a Fifth Estate in Enhancing 
Democratic Accountability
First, the cases all illustrate how networked individuals were 
able to source their own information, independent of the press 
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and the state’s apparatus, and also network with like-minded 
individuals in ways that could hold other institutions more 
accountable. The press might be state-controlled, but when 
it failed to report events or cover key issues that could be 
demonstrably seen online, then its credibility was weakened. 
In Nanjing, when netizens photographed the impact of the gas 
explosion and distributed it globally, its importance could not 
be denied. Likewise, the official accounts of the Guangzhou 
Maritime Court were discredited by bloggers who critically 
looked at the reports of the agency, and the concerns raised 
by bloggers were corroborated through multiple sources. 
In such ways, even in China, despite controls on the press 
and Internet users, these cases provide evidence of the 
emergence of a Fifth Estate of networked individuals, capable 
of enhancing the accountability of major institutional actors. 
In fact, each one illustrated that efforts to exert state 
control tended to have the exact opposite effect– the so-
called Streisand effect. The American entertainer, Barbara 
Streisand, sought to suppress information about her home, 
only to magnify its coverage online (Greenberg, 2007). 
In each of the three cases, there were clear attempts to 
suppress or limit coverage by the press, which might well 
have contributed in part to the vitality of online exposure. 
Censorship in the digital age can ‘backfire’ (Cacciottolo, 
2012), in part because of the role of a Fifth Estate.
Dynamics of Reframing Issues and the Scope  
of Debate
Secondly, netizens did reframe discussion of each of 
the three events. One of the most critical aspects of 
Schattschneider’s (1960) perspective on the dynamics of 
political conflicts is the role of that agenda-setting and 
issue-framing can play in the outcome of political conflict. 
As Schattschneider argued, the most important strategy 
of politics is to control the scope of conflict. As he (1960, 
p. 105) put it: “Whoever decides what the game is about, 
decides also who can get into the game”. In each case, the 
success of networked individuals was tied to their ability to 
challenge official accounts – or lack of official accounts – 
with information that reframed the issue at stake. In each 
case, this reframing changed the scope of the debate and 
the political dynamics of the event. 
Agenda-setting has been a focus of research on the media in 
China. For example, Jonathan Hassid (2012) has examined a 
number of case studies to assess the role of blogging, asking 
whether blogs increase or decrease political tensions. He 
found that the impact of blogging depended on whether 
bloggers led or followed the mass media agenda. If bloggers 
initiated issues, they tended to raise tensions, while they 
reduced tensions when they followed the press agenda. We 
did not focus on leading or following media coverage, but 
on whether networked individuals, which include but are 
not only bloggers, reframed the issues. We have sought to 
put the impact of blogging into a bigger picture, focused 
on the role of a Fifth Estate. 
For example, the cases show that discussion of the PX 
chemical plant was shifted from a source of local jobs and 
economic development to a public health hazard. There was 
sufficient consensus early in the process for the construction 
to be launched with approval by key agencies as an economic 
development milestone for Xiamen. However, opposition by 
local media, experts, including reputable scientists, bloggers, 
and protesters, whose actions were orchestrated in part 
through the Web-based campaign, shifted the issue from 
economic benefit to an environmental and health hazard 
for the local community. 
In Nanjing, blogs and social media discussion of the gas 
explosion in Nanjing rapidly reconfigured debate by making 
what was framed as a routine investigation of the failure of 
a construction company to follow proper standards, to be 
recast as a cover up of a serious explosion and resulting 
safety issues. This created a major issue over the credibility 
of the press and the competence of public officials in 
protecting public safety, implying they had something to 
hide. Rather than control rumours and contain conflict, 
restrictions redefined the issue and the contestants. 
Similarly, by challenging the expense claims of officials in the 
Guangzhou Maritime Court, bloggers reframed a story about 
officials on a study visit to investigate practices in other 
countries, to be seen as involved in a wasteful ‘boondoggle’, 
if not an official scandal over misleading expense claims for 
a holiday. Anti-corruption resonated with a broad public. 
How the Internet Supports the Role  
of Netizens
A number of factors contributed to the ability of the Internet 
to support the Fifth Estate role of netizens in these cases. 
The Limits of Filtering and Control of Netizens
Networked individuals – Netizens – were able to overcome 
efforts to filter and block information in ways that enabled 
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them to source critical information and locate others who 
had similar concerns. The stark example is Nanjing, where 
bloggers posted information about the gas explosion 
within an hour of the explosion, accompanied by graphic 
photographs and videos of the aftermath. Even more 
dramatic was the video clip shared online of an official 
interrupting a live TV channel claiming that the station did 
not have permission to broadcast about the event. As noted 
above, in these cases, the Streisand effect was real. Efforts 
to censure tended to raise the profile of the event, and the 
legitimacy of the information provided online.
Episodes of Contagion: Striking a Popular Chord
Issues were identified that struck a chord with netizens, 
evidenced by the rapid spread of support, what Shattschneider 
called contagion. For instance, tweets went viral around the 
need for donations of blood after the Nanjing explosion. The 
Web-orchestrated campaign in Xiamen led to a huge popular 
vote and turnouts at meetings in opposition to the project. 
Moreover, an impact on contagion could be evidenced by 
the sheer level of online activity. In this way, the Internet 
not only enabled many people to easily make very limited 
expressions of support, but also provided social information 
and was likely to have reinforced the depth and scale of 
support for the issue to engage a critical mass of citizens in 
each case. Netizens could see online and in public forums and 
protests that others shared their views. However, the degree 
to which an issue can capture the public’s attention is difficult 
to gauge in advance, as well as its failure in most cases, 
given the degree to which these cases are exceptions to the 
norm. Nevertheless, they show the democratic potential of 
the Internet as a tool for accountability, which can cause 
institutions to anticipate this potential and therefore self-
regulate themselves to avoid embarrassment or censure.
Protecting the Safety and Anonymity  
of Netizens
Netizens felt safe to participate online. Whether it was a case 
of safety in numbers or a sense of anonymity, netizens were 
told they were safe, and felt safe enough from retribution, 
that they were able to participate online and in live protests. 
In the case of the PX campaign, repeated messages 
reassured netizens that it was safe to express their views 
online, underscoring the significance of this perception. 
One factor contributing to the safety of netizens was the 
degree that the Fifth Estate creates a moving target. Actions 
by the Fifth Estate are difficult to sustain overtime, because 
they are not institutionalized. In these cases, however, 
sustainability was not an issue. In each case, netizens were 
able to reframe the issue rapidly and build on the mobilization 
of a sizeable public to effect change in a short period of time. 
It was not necessary to sustain their campaign for extended 
periods, which could have reversed their gains and enabled 
the government to undermine their role. And because these 
Fifth Estate actions can arise spontaneously and then 
disappear when the issue is engaged, they are difficult if 
not impossible to control. There is no institution to repress.
Social Movements as Only One Strategy  
of the Fifth Estate
Similarly, the cases also illustrate that the Fifth Estate is 
distinct from a social movement. Networked individuals can 
hold government and the press more accountable even if 
acting in their individual capacities. The Fifth Estate is not 
equivalent to a social movement. A political movement did 
arise around the PX project, leading to some local protests, 
but social movements were not central to either of the other 
cases. A movement is one of many potential strategies of 
networked individuals, as they redefine the issue and the 
scope of the conflict. This distinction helps underline the 
point that the ability to source information and networks 
could lead to social movements, but not necessarily. The 
empowerment of networked individuals, for example, could 
undermine a social movement, such as by challenging the 
narrative of its leadership, correcting misinformation, and 
preventing the spread of false rumours. 
Summary and Conclusion
The Fifth Estate concept captures the democratic potential 
of the Internet to be used in ways that create new forms of 
more pluralistic accountability. Even in China, with a record 
of efforts to control media and information technologies, it 
is possible to find dramatic evidence of how a Fifth Estate 
role can be played by networked individuals. 
This concept is valuable by moving away from conventional 
views of e-democracy, which view the Internet as a tool for 
transforming democratic institutions, such as parliamentary 
consultation or elections. Instead, the Internet can support the 
empowerment of individuals with access to and skills in the use 
of this technology. It can be used to enhance the communicative 
power of individuals through a variety of strategies, such 
as enabling netizens to reframe political controversy. 
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Decades ago, E. E. Schattschneider used the concept of 
the semi-sovereign people to counter idealistic models of 
representative democracy, often anchored in assumptions 
about a large proportion of the public being knowledgeable 
and aware of most issues, and representatives reflecting 
the weight of public opinion. In the same way, debate 
over digital democracy continues to be shaped by ideal 
models of democracy, suggesting that the Internet enables 
politics to move toward these ideal models, illustrating the 
potential relevance of Schattschneider’s counter-models 
based on more realistic models of pluralist democracy. 
One element of his formulation assumes that people get 
involved intermittently, primarily around conflicts (issues), 
and controlling the scope of conflicts – such as by defining 
the issues – is the central strategy of politics. 
Netizens, such as by creating and sourcing their own 
information resources, can undermine the ability of 
authorities to control the definition of conflicts and the 
subsequent scope of conflicts. They represent another 
source of authority in a more pluralist process and thereby 
can alter the dynamics and outcome of the political process. 
It is this more limited albeit more realistic role of the public 
that gives rise to the concept of the semi-sovereign people. 
Similarly, netizens acting as a Fifth Estate cannot approach 
the power and authority of the state and other institutional 
authorities, but they can sometimes surface new information, 
independently of key institutional actors, redefine issues 
and effect meaningful change in the scope and outcome of 
politics by independently sourcing information and networks. 
However, the case studies explored here also highlight 
limitations of the Fifth Estate. First, these are exceptional 
cases. In most instances, netizens have not succeeded in 
challenging state policy and the state controlled press 
coverage of events. The Fifth Estate does not routinely 
provide a source of democratic accountability, but has 
presented the potential to do so. That said, this possibility 
of accountability can have an important influence on 
institutions that recognize this democratic potential. 
Secondly, the role of the Fifth Estate is not necessarily 
optimal for all stakeholders as it can be redistributive in 
creating unanticipated negative consequences, such as in 
blocking the PX plant, but leading it to be moved to another 
locale. Of course, this is true of any successful political action 
– the potential to result in unintended or unanticipated 
negative consequences or spill-over effects. 
Nevertheless, these dramatic cases of netizens changing the 
dynamics of public issues in China illustrate the possibility 
for a Fifth Estate role to emerge even in the context of 
a state controlled media. This underscores the need for 
more comparative case studies of Fifth Estate activities in 
China and other nations with more and less considerable 
state regulation of the press and the Internet in order to 
further develop the themes and patterns identified by this 
study. This article provides some evidence that the Fifth 
Estate could hold out a promise for taking studies of the 
Internet in China beyond the agenda setting framework, 
by placing agenda-setting within a more comprehensive 
political framework. While these exceptional cases do not 
validate our theoretical perspective, they do reinforce the 
viability of the concept of the Fifth Estate as a framework for 
understanding the political dynamics of the Internet in nations 
that are not liberal democratic regimes with a free press. 
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